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RIGHTS OF THE PUBLIC EMPLOYEE UNDER
THE ILLINOIS CIVIL SERVICE SYSTEM:

A PROGRESSION OF THE LAW
by REA T. MARxiN*
With a vast number of individuals on its employment rolls,
government, whether federal, state or local, is fast becoming the
largest employer in the United States. How government is dealing with the problems presented by the large number of individuals it employs is becoming increasingly important in light
of recent decisions expanding the definitions of personal and
property rights to include employment rights. This article will
concern itself with the procedural and substantive law that protects the rights of public employees.
To begin an evaluation of civil service law, one must look to
the reasons for its adoption. Since the birth of this nation, our
leaders have recognized the value of a civil service merit system to the orderly administration of our country's day-to-day
affairs. During his Presidency, George Washington set high
standards for federal government service based upon the individual's qualifications for the position sought.' This concept
was eroded in subsequent administrations by preference for
veterans, geographical distribution of appointments, and reliance
2
on Congressional recommendations.
Culminating in Andrew Jackson's administration the use
of patronage and the building of political machines led to low
morale, indifferent service and payment for jobs." The excesses of the "spoils" system eventually led to public demand
for reform. In 1851, Congress passed a resolution requesting
Cabinet officers to draw up a plan for the classification of their
subordinates, to equalize salaries and to provide for "'a fair and
impartial examination of the qualifications of clerks and for
promoting them from one grade to another'. '4 Subsequently,
in 1853, Congress passed legislation which carried out those
recommendations."

0 Ph.B., University of Chicago; J.D., John Marshall Law School
(1964). Editor of a newsletter "On the Civil Side." State's Attorney's
Office, Civil Division.
1. H.E. KAPLA, THE LAw or Cvm SERvicm 1 (1958).
2. Id. at 2.
3. Id. at 4.
4. Id. at 6.
5. Act of March 3, 1853, ch. 97, § 3, 10 Stat. 209.
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At the state and local levels, the evils of the "spoils" system also led to pressure for reform. In 1877, New York became the first state to form a Civil Service Reform Association.6
That system served as a model for reform associations in other
states, all dedicated to the regulation and improvement of civil
service. Following the movement initiated by the federal and
state governments, municipalities and counties began to incorporate civil service systems into their local governments.7
STABILITY AND CONTROL OF THE WORK FORCE IN
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT

It is a well known and generally accepted rule that no one
has an absolute right to employment by a governmental body. 8
In Kennedy v. Sanchez, the three judge panel of the District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois stated:
The concept of due process is flexible. The procedural safeguards called for depend upon a balancing of the governmental
and private interests involved. The government's interest is in
maintaining efficiency through the prompt removal or suspension of employees who presently contribute to inefficiency because of their past conduct. The employee's interest is in avoiding unwarranted dismissal or suspension 'for cause' when it is
not warranted by the facts. 9
Governmental agencies faced with a vast number of public
employees find it increasingly necessary to maintain stability
and control over their work force through the use of, among
other devices, disciplinary measures. When such measures are
necessary, these agencies must adhere to the laws, regulations
and statutes which were promulgated not only to discourage misconduct on the part of the employee but additionally to control
the application of sanctions in order that they be fair, reasonable
and protect the rights of the employees involved. The disciplinary sanctions of suspension and dismissal from the classified
service are surrounded by statuatory procedural due process
requirements as well as substantive laws to guard against arbitrary application of these sanctions.
Although discipline is usually considered a form of punishment for correcting a dereliction on the part of an employee,
in a positive sense, discipline is a tool for maintaining stability
and control within the governmental work force. When viewed
in this sense, the objective of discipline is to elicit certain de6. H.E. KAPLAN, supra note 1, at 9.
7. Id. at 27. Also, it is worthy of note that Cook County, Illinois,

was the first county in the country to develop a merit system.

8. Kennedy v. Sanchez, 349 F. Supp. 863 (N.D. Ill. 1972) prob. juris.
noted Phillips v. Kennedy, 41 U.S.L.W. 3527 (U.S. April 2, 1973), argued,
42 U.S.L.W. 3281 (U.S. Nov. 13, 1973).
9. 349 F. Supp. at 865.
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sired behavior from employees-it is a method of teaching and
training. In addition to disciplinary measures, management
uses rewards such as salary raises and promotions to act as incentives for further cooperative accomplishments. As stated by
Eugene F. Berrodin, ideally
[e]ffective employee disciplinary practices contribute to the
smooth functioning of an organization by marshaling the best
efforts of its human resources. Thus defined, discipline is a
positive force used to motivate employees and to insure desired
standards of performance. In an organization with effective
discipline, rules are willingly observed because employees understand and support them as a result of their over-all commitment
to the organization and its purposes. 10
DUE PROCESS
Theory
The policy embodied in the Civil Service rules and regulations is to afford the employee protection against arbitrary and
capricious suspension or discharge by his employer.'1
These
laws generally provide that no public employee may be discharged for any reason other than one detrimental to the public
service and also provide for administrative review of disciplinary measures. In order to insure strict adherence to the law,
judicial review of administrative decisions is provided for under
the Administrative Review Act, 12 or by writs of certiorari or
mandamus. 13
Specific Safeguards Afforded to the Certified Employee
In Illinois, the appointing authority has the right to suspend
a certified employee for cause for a period of up to 30 days without pay and without review. 14 If the suspension exceeds 30 days,
10. Berrodin, Forward to C. SASO & E. JANIS, DISCIPLINARY POLICY
(1973).
11. ILL. REV.STAT. ch. 24, §§ 10-1-18, 10-1-18.1, 10-1-45, 21-10 (1973);

AND PRACTICES

id. ch.
12.
13.
14.

24%, §§ 79 88, 91; id. ch. 34, § 1118; id. ch. 127, § 63b111.
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, §§ 264 et seq. (1973).
Id. ch. 110, § 265.
Id. ch. 127, § 63b111.

Hearings-Disciplinary action. No officer or employee under jurisdiction B, relating to merit and fitness, who has been appointed
under the rules and after examination shall be removed or discharged, demoted or suspended for a period of more than 30 days,
except for cause, upon written charges approved by the Director of
Personnel, and after an opportunity to be heard in his own defense
if he makes written request to the Commission within 15 days after
the serving of the written charges upon him. Upon the filing of

such a request for a hearing, the Commission shall grant a hearing
within 30 days. The time and place of the hearing shall be fixed

by the Commission and due notice thereof given the appointing
officer and the employee. The hearing shall be public, and the
officer or employee is entitled to call witnesses in his own defense
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the employer must adhere to the statutory due process requirements.15
Statutory due process requires that a certified employee
suspended beyond 30 days, or who is subject to discharge, must
be given written notice of the charges against him. If requested
by the employee within 15 days after receiving the required
notice, 16 such employee must be afforded a public hearing either
before the Civil Service Commission having jurisdiction or by
a Board or Officer appointed by the Commission. At this hearing the employee has the right to representation by counsel, to
present witnesses in his own behalf and to cross-examine ad17
verse witnesses.
Further safeguards are provided by the right of an employee
to judicial review of an administrative decision in the circuit
court, with further recourse to the Illinois Appellate and Supreme Courts. Under the Administrative Review Act, all civil
service employees, including teachers, policemen and firemen,
may resort to the courts for relief from arbitrary or unjust decisions or for the failure to follow statutory guidelines by an
administrative agency.' 8 The civil service employees of Cook
County are exempted from this Act. They may seek review only
by the extraordinary writs of certiorari or mandamus. 19
Due Process in the Courts
ProceduralDue Process
The courts are strict in requiring administrative agencies to
abide by procedural as well as substantive law in arriving at
their decisions. However, where the order of discharge is based
on proven evidence and the Civil Service Commission adheres
to the statutory due process requirements, the decision of the
Commission will be sustained.
One of the earliest cases decided in Illinois concerning procedural due process was City of Chicago v. Luthardt.20 The Chief
Clerk of the Detective Bureau of the City of Chicago, who was
under civil service status, was dismissed without notice or hearand to have the aid of counsel . . . the Civil Service Commission
may, for disciplinary purposes, suspend an employee for a period
of time not to exceed 90 days, and in no event to exceed a period of
120 days from the date of any suspension of such employee, pending
investigation of such charges ....
Nothing in this Section shall
limit the authority to suspend an employee for a reasonable period
not exceeding 30 days.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.

18. Id. § 63bllla.

19. Id. ch. 110, § 265.
20. 191 Ill. 516, 61 N.E. 410 (1901).
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ing. His dismissal was initiated by the Chief of Police with the
approval of the Common Council. The appellate court, in ordering his reinstatement, determined that his removal was illegal
in that there was a failure to follow the statutory due process
requirements of notice and hearing.
Section 12 of the State Civil Service Act recognized three
types of punishment-suspension of a subordinate not exceeding
30 days to be administered by an officer; suspension exceeding
30 days or discharge, to be inflicted only after charges have been
filed and a hearing had before the Commission. 21 "IT]he Civil
Service law is necessarily a part of the contract of employment
of every civil service employee, and such employee can only be
discharged in the manner provided by Sec. 12 of said Act."' 22 This
holding affords protection to civil service employees based on a
contract theory. For example, in People ex rel. Polen v. Hoehler,23 this protection was afforded to a certified institution
worker. The court held that, because she was automatically discharged without notice, written charges or hearing, her discharge
was illegal because it was arbitrary, unreasonable and contrary
to law,2 4 and her reinstatement was ordered. So it can be seen
that if procedural law is not strictly adhered to the courts will
not hesitate to overrule a decision of the Commission disciplining
an employee.
The Civil Service Commission may not impose qualifications
or conditions to employment not authorized by law. People ex
rel. Baird v. Stevenson 25 is illustrative. Plaintiff was an Assistant State Librarian who was employed prior to the passage of
the Civil Service Act of 1911. Section 3b of that Act provided
that all persons holding positions prior to passage were to become
members of the classified state civil service but that all future
21. Law of July 13, 1973, ch. 24%, § 12 [1953] Ill. Laws 1136 (repealed
1955). Subject matter currently covered by ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 127, §
63b111 (1973).

22. People ex rel. Jacobs v.Coffin, 282 Ill. 599, 610, 119 N.E. 54, 58
(1918).
23. 405 Ill. 322, 90 N.E.2d 729 (1950).

24. Id. at 328, 90 N.E.2d at 733. Plaintiff was discharged under a rule
adopted by the Commission which provided that "[a]n employee absent
from duty without leave for a period of three successive days or longer,

without proper written notice ... shall be considered to have resigned."
Id. at 324, 90 N.E.2d at 731. The court held that the rule amounts to
no more than that three day's absence conclusively operates as a discharge if the superintendent so decides and is the equivalent to conclusive evidence that a resignation has taken place regardless of the intent
of the employee. The Commission had not yet been granted authority
by statute to say what shall constitute a resignation, and the rule also
resulted in an ouster of the jurisdiction of the courts to review the legality of the "resignation". The rule was also unreasonable and arbitrary
since in many cases three day's absence without notice might occur irre-

gardless of the slightest indication of improper conduct on the part of
the employee.

25. 270 Ill. 569, 110 N.E. 814 (1915).
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applicants would be required to take competitive examinations.
The Civil Service Commission ordered plaintiff and all other employees in the State Library who had not qualified by examination to take the next examination for the position of Assistant
State Librarian. The plaintiff did not take the examination and
the Commission ordered her discharge.
The supreme court held that "the State Civil Service Commission exercises purely statutory powers and must find in the
statute its warrant for the exercise of any authority which it
claims. ' 20 Since the law did not confer "authority to require
an examination of any officer or employee in the classified service" 27 upon the Civil Service Commission, the order of the Commission for plaintiff to take an examination was not authorized
by law. Thus, her discharge was void.
In two cases, employees have contended that the Commission
only has jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of discharge within
the 30 day period established under the statute for disciplinary
suspension.
The issue was first raised in Foreman v. Civil Service Commission.28 A policeman was discharged on a finding of misconduct based upon the abandonment of his post of duty without
permission.
Upon the Commission's appeal from the trial court's finding
that the dismissal was unwarranted, the plaintiff asserted for
the first time that since the Commission had not heard the case
within the 30 day period of his suspension, he was automatically
reinstated to his position and that thereafter the Commission had
no jurisdiction to try him. The appellate court determined that
the statute did not impose a 30 day time limit for the Commission to hear and determine a cause or lose jurisdiction.
This issue was again considered in the case of Brewton v.
Civil Service Commission. 9 The court held that the statute, neither directly nor by implication, requires that charges leading
to dismissal must be filed and heard within the 30 day suspension period.
The two preceding cases were decided under § 10-1-18 of the
Cities and Villages Act.30 In 1972, the General Assembly
amended the Personnel Code for state employees to provide, inter
alia, that "[u]pon the filing of ... a request for a hearing, the
Commission shall grant a hearing within 30 days."'
In McRey26. Id. at 571, 110 N.E. at 815.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Id. at 573, 110 N.E. at 816.
7 Ill. App. 2d 122, 129 N.E.2d 245 (1955).
115 Ill. App. 2d 460, 253 N.E.2d 504 (1969).
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 24, § 10-1-18 (1973).

31. Id. ch. 127, § 63b111

(amended by P.A. 77-1662

(1972)).
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nolds v. Civil Service Commission32 the Illinois Appellate Court
for the First District held that the use of the word "shall" by
the General Assembly mandated that the Commission hold a
hearing within 30 days after requested by .the employee and that
upon failure to do so, the Commission lost its jurisdiction to hear
the case.
Jurisdictionof the Reviewing Courts
A landmark case which reviews prior cases and analyzes the
law relating to the rights of civil service employees as they pertain to examination, appointment and removal under civil service
law, with particular reference to Section 12 of the State Civil
Service Act,3 3 is that of Nolting v. Civil Service Commission. 4
In Nolting, a policeman was ordered discharged by the Civil
Service Commission for misconduct. He was charged with 'abandoning his beat without permission, driving his personal automobile while on duty, striking and damaging a parked automobile,
failing to leave his name and address after the accident, and failing to respond to final roll call or to calls from his superior officers. The policeman's excuse was that he had undergone a blackout caused by high blood pressure.
The trial court held that the Commission's decision was too
severe, and, upon the policeman's agreement to waive all back
salary as a condition precedent, the court ordered his immediate
reinstatement.
On appeal, the appellate court held that what the trial court
had measured was not the evidence but "the gravity of the charge
against the severity of the punishment"3 5 and had substituted
suspension for discharge in consideration for a waiver of claims
for salary. A court's assumption that it had general jurisdiction
over orders of the Civil Service Commission so 'as to give it the
power to decide whether the punishment ordered was too severe
and to enter orders more kind and merciful was held to be erroneous. Trial courts are not super-commissions. 36 The trial
court's jurisdiction is limited to appellate review, and the scope
of review is based on the fundamental law which is granted to
a particular commission.
The court went on to state the following:
Perhaps intentionally or perhaps by legislative oversight, no similar
amendment was made to the Cities and Villages Act.
32. 18 Ill. App. 3d 1058, 310 N.E.2d 662 (1974).

33. Law of July 13, 1953, ch. 24 , § 12 [1953] Ill. Laws 1136 (repealed
1955). Subject matter currently covered by ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 127, §

63b111 (1973).

34. 7 Ill. App. 2d 147, 129 N.E.2d 236 (1955).
35. Id. at 150, 129 N.E.2d at 238.
36. Id. at 152-53, 129 N.E.2d at 239.
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The Administrative Review Act has been sustained and an appeal
under it may be had to review all questions of law and of fact
presented by the entire record. The findings and conclusions of
the administrative agency on questions of fact are to be considered prima facie true and correct. The reviewing court is rethe findings
quired to determine from the entire record whether
37
are against the manifest weight of the evidence.

The court found that the offense charged was amply supported
by the evidence, was service related and was not trivial.
Further, the court compared a police department to a military department and indicated that strict discipline must be enforced in order for the department to function effectively. The
court determined that substitution of the judgment of a court
for that of the Commissioner of Police, who initiates the charges
before the Civil Service Commission, would result in damage to
the Police Department and to the quality of its service to the
public. Moreover, such a substitution would break down the morale of the Department.

8

Only the appointing officer has the power to suspend; therefore, since the Commission has no power to suspend, the courts
upon review of a ruling by the Commission may not by indirection, such as by an agreement to waive back salary, accomplish
39
a result equal to suspension.

The appellate court also alluded to the question of the separation of powers between the government branches involved.
It pointed out that the courts must recognize that the relationship
of the executive branch to its employees was involved and that
40
the discipline of an entire department may be affected.
Although Nolting held that the jurisdiction of the reviewing
court is limited to a determination of whether the Commission's
findings were against the manifest weight of the evidence, the
court did not address itself to the question of the sufficiency of
the record of the Commission's proceedings in setting forth the
evidence upon which their finding was based.
This question was considered by the Illinois Supreme Court
in Funkhouser v. Coffin.41 The court criticized the Commission
because its record did not disclose the facts constituting the cause
for removal. The record stated that "the evidence was heard
37. Id. at 158, 129 N.E.2d at 242. Notice that the requirement for reversal used here is the same as in all other appellate review in Illinois.
Cf. Murphy v. Houston, 250 Ill. App. 385 (1928), wherein the court held
that the record of the hearing must contain evidence from which it could
reasonably and justifiably find cause for its order of dismissal of a civil
service employee. 250 Ill. App. at 400.
38. 7 Ill. App. 2d at 160, 129 N.E.2d at 243.
39. Id. at 163, 129 N.E.2d at 244.
40. Id. at 162, 129 N.E.2d at 244.
41. 301 Ill. 257, 133 N.E. 649 (1922).
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and appellee was found guilty as charged. '42 The court held that
this was not sufficient to show jurisdiction 43 and that such a
statement was a mere conclusion of law. The court remanded
the cause for further hearing by the Commission.
In addition to the requirement that the record of the Civil
Service Commission should recite the facts which show jurisdiction, it is also necessary that the record disclose the facts upon
which the decision was based. As stated by the appellate court
44
in Cord v. Coffin:
The only sure and effective way to insure a superior tribunal
that the judgment of the inferior tribunal is not arbitrary or
prejudiced would be the reproduction of all the evidence. 4"
PROBATIONARY EMPLOYEES

An employee who has passed a civil service competitive examination and has been appointed to a position must survive a
probationary period of six months before he may be certified.
During this probationary period the supervisors have the opportunity to observe his ability, character, adaptability and other
requirements for the particular position he occupies. If he is
not discharged during this period he acquires classified status
and may not thereafter be discharged except in the manner provided by the Civil Service laws. However, if the employee proves
to be unsatisfactory during this period he may be discharged
46
without a hearing.
The lack of entitlement to procedural due process safeguards
was questioned in Rose v. Civil Service Commission 47 where a
probationary employee was discharged without a prior hearing.
The employee was suspended because of false statements made
in his application for employment. Illinois law with respect to
discharge of probationers required:
(1) the assignment of a reason therefore to the Commissioners;
42. Id. at 263, 133 N.E. at 651.
43. Under the Civil Service Act there are but two ways by which

the Commission may obtain jurisdiction of the question whether an

employee should be discharged, one being an investigation upon its
own motion and the other upon charges filed with the Commission.
People ex rel. Mosby v. Stevenson, 272 Ill. 215, 220, 111 N.E. 595,
597 (1916).
People ex rel. Fosse v. Allman, 329 Ill. App. 296, 68 N.E.2d 203 (1946)
and Caetan v. Gregory, 329 Ill. App. 307, 68 N.E.2d 193 (1946), held that
the production of a transcript of the evidence was essential to establish
the jurisdiction of the Commission. 329 Ill. App. at 320-21, 68 N.E.2d
at 200.
44. 226 Ill. App. 326 (1922).
45. Id. at 331.
46. See, e.g., ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 24 , §§ 38b7, 88, 124 (1973).
47. 14 Ill. App. 2d 337, 144 N.E.2d 768 (1957).
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4
(2) the consent of the Commission to the discharge. 8
In seeking the employee's discharge, the Commissioner of Police
complied with the statute set out above, and the Civil Service
Commission approved the discharge.
In upholding the discharge, the appellate court stated:
'The purpose of the probationary period is to enable the appointing officer to determine whether a permanent appointment is desirable. That question is left solely to his judgment,
49 and he has
the whole probationary period in which to decide it.'
REPEATED SUSPENSIONS

The question has arisen as to whether an appointing officer
can circumvent the statutory requirements of notice and hearing.
People ex rel. Lasser v. Ramsey 0 involved a survey inspector
who was repeatedly suspended for 30 days or less with reinstatements of one day between suspensions for a period of six months,
after which period he was suspended indefinitely, pending the
disposition of criminal charges against him for carrying a concealed weapon. He was adjudged guilty of these charges and
subsequently removed from his position by the Commission.
Contending that the suspensions subsequent to the first 30
day suspension were illegal, the plaintiff claimed reimbursement
for back salary during the periods of illegal suspension.5 ' The
defense was based on the statutory power of the appointing officer to suspend a subordinate for a reasonable period not exceed52
ing 30 days.
The appellate court found that the construction urged by the
48. Id. at 340, 144 N.E.2d at 769; this statute was repealed in 1961.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24 , § 124 (1973) provides:
At any time during the period of probation the appointing officer
may discharge the person so certified and shall forthwith notify the
board in writing of such discharge. If such person is not thus discharged his or her appointment shall be deemed complete.
49. 14 Ill. App. 2d at 341, 144 N.E.2d at 770.
50. 23 Ill. App. 2d 100, 161 N.E.2d 690 (1959).
51. See text accompanying notes 58-77, infra.
52. Law of April 10, 1961, ch. 24 , § 51 [1961] Ill. Laws 426 (repealed
1967). Subject matter currently covered by ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, § 101-18 (1973) which provides in relevant part:
[N]o officer or employee in the classified civil service of any municipality who is appointed under the rules and after examination, may
be removed or discharged, or suspended for a period of more than
30 days, except for cause upon written charges and after an opportunity to be heard in his own defense.
Contrary to the old section, the new section additionally provides:
Nothing ir this Division 1 limits the power of any officer to suspend
a subordinate for a reasonable period, not exceeding 30 days except
that any employee or officer suspended for more than 5 days or suspended within 6 months after a previous suspension shall be entitled,
upon request, to a hearing before the civil service commission concerning the propriety of such suspension (emphasis added).
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defense was untenable since it would vest a power of removal
in the head of a department, which power rests exclusively in
a Civil Service Commission where the hearing is surrounded by
procedural due process safeguards.
RIGHTS OF LAID-OFT EMPLOYEES

The rights of about-to-be laid-off employees were considered
by the Illinois Supreme Court in Powell v. Jones, 5 a class action
for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief by plaintiffs on
behalf of themselves and approximately one thousand other state
employees who had received lay-off notices.
Plaintiffs claimed that they were constitutionally entitled to
remain in their employment until their employment was terminated by a full prior hearing with the right to full procedural
due process safeguards, thus affording the certified employee the
same due process protections prior to lay-off as he is entitled
to prior to discharge.
The supreme court noted the expansion of the concept of
due process in relation to public employees in recent years and
distinguished two recent decisions of the United States Supreme
Court: Board of Regents v. Roth 14 and Perry v. Sindermann.55
In Roth the U.S. Supreme Court had held that due process did
not require a hearing prior to a refusal to renew a nontenured
state teacher's contract unless the plaintiff could show a deprivation of a "property" interest in continued employment or that
such nonrenewal deprived him of some other constitutionally
protected right. Sindermann involved a college professor who
had been employed for ten years in a Texas state junior college.
He was not offered a renewal contract nor was he granted the
hearing to which he alleged he was entitled. He further alleged
that failure to grant him a hearing violated his free speech guarantee under the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution, alleging that the basis for the nonrenewal was his criticism of the
college administration. Contrary to Roth, the Court held that
the plaintiff had established a property interest in his continued
employment. Even though plaintiff's interest in such employment was not secured by a formal contract, he possessed a de
facto property right of which he could not be deprived without
a hearing.
The Illinois Supreme Court distinguished the instant case in
that it involved a lay-off, whereas Roth and Sindermann dealt
with a failure to renew employment. Therefore, the court con53. 56 Il1.
2d 70, 305 N.E.2d 166 (1973).
54. 408 U.S.564 (1972).

55. 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
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cluded that there are qualitative differences between lay-off and
discharge of certified employees. A certified employee prior to
discharge is entitled to a full hearing with all the protections
of procedural due process. However, the court stated that neither the Federal nor the State Constitutions require a plenary
hearing before lay-off of a certified employee and that such a
requirement would create confusion, delay and uncertainty in the
functioning of state government. 56
DIscIPLINED CERTIFIED EMPLOYEE'S RIGHT TO PAY

Generally, the remedies of a certified employee who is
wrongfully removed are reinstatement and payment of lost salary. These remedies may be granted either by the Administrative Commission after a full hearing or by the courts upon appeal.
If upon review the court determines that the employee was denied due process or that the ruling of the Commission was against
the manifest weight of the evidence, the court will order rein57
statement.
The case law concerning the entitlement of a disciplined certified employee to payment of salary during the period in which
he is prevented from performing his duties is in a state of conflict. However, the following principles may be gleaned from
a careful reading of the cases discussed below. First, a certified
employee who has been illegally removed or suspended is entitled
to pay from the date of his illegal removal or suspension. A
suspension or removal is deemed illegal if the statutory due process procedures are not followed. When an action taken by the
Commission is held by the court to be against the manifest weight
of the evidence or arbitrary and capricious, the removal or suspension is considered to be illegal from the date of the judgment
rather than from the date of the actual suspension or removal.
Second, payment of salary to a de facto employee during the
period in which the de jure employee is prevented from performing his duty is a pro tanto defense by the employer to an action
by the de jure employee to recover such salary. However, this
defense is not available to the employer where the de jure employee has been illegally removed or suspended.
In People ex rel. Sellers v. Brady5 s a certified employee was
summarily removed from her position as stenographer in the office of the Auditor of Public Accounts. The auditor contended
that her removal was not illegal because the Civil Service Act
of 1911 was unconstitutional. The supreme court upheld the con56. 56 Ill. 2d at 82, 305 N.E.2d at 172.

57. See text accompanying notes 34-40, supra.
58. 262 Ill. 578, 105 N.E. 1 (1914).
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stitutionality of the Act and affirmed the award of her salary
59
from the date of her illegal removal.
When a certified employee is suspended beyond a period of
30 days, he is entitled to notice by written charges and a hearing."° If the period of suspension exceeds 30 days and written
charges have not been served upon the employee or a public hearing has not been held such suspension is illegal, and the certified
employee is entitled to back salary for the period of his suspension."1
The question of whether payment of salary in good faith to
a de facto officer or employee constitutes an effective defense
by the employer to an action for salary by the de jure officer
or employee was first considered in People ex rel. Blachly v. Coffin.6 2 The plaintiff had survived a six month probationary period and was summarily discharged the day after the expiration
of the probationary period. In holding that the plaintiff was
entitled to salary from the date of his actual removal to the date
of his reinstatement the court stated that "[t] he legal right to
an office carries with it the right to the salary which is incident
'63
to the title to the office and not to its occupation and exercise.
The defense that the salary had been paid to a de facto officer
was rejected without reference to the illegality of the removal.
However, the defense was properly rejected as plaintiff had not
been given notice and a hearing, which constituted an illegal removal.
People ex rel. Sartison v. Schmidt6 4 again considered this
same question. A certified employee was discharged after notice
and a hearing before the Commission. He was voluntarily reinstated by his employer.0 5 The general rule stated by the court
that
59. In People ex rel. McDonnell v. Thompson, 316 Ill. 11, 146 N.E.
473 (1925), plaintiff was discharged after a hearing before the Civil Service Commission, which record was "quashed and for naught esteemed"

by the circuit court. The Illinois Supreme Court stated:
The rule in this State is, that the payment in good faith of the salary
of an officer to a de facto officer constitutes a bar to an action by
the de jure officer or the salary paid to the de facto officer ....
The well defined exception to the above rule is that where the relator is illegally removed from his office and the salary has been
paid to another person illegally appointed in his stead a writ of mandamus will be awarded requiring the reinstatement of the relator
in office and the payment of his salary during his illegal removal.
Id. at 16-17, 146 N.E. at 475. The plaintiff was entitled to salary from
the date the circuit court quashed the record.
60. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 127, § 63b111 (1973).
61. People ex rel. Petlock v. McDonough, 131 Ill. App. 2d 469, 268
N.E.2d
62.
63.
64.

267 (1971).
279 Ill. 401, 117 N.E. 85 (1917) [hereinafter cited as Coffin].
Id. at 410, 117 N.E. at 89.
281 Ill. 211, 117 N.E. 1037 (1917).

65. The plaintiff had been discharged for refusal to take an examina-
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[i]f the payment of the salary or other compensation to be made
by the government is made in good faith to the officer de facto

while he is still in possession of the office, the government can-

not be compelled to pay a second time to the officer de jure
when he has recovered the office-at least where the officer de
facto held the position by color or title66
was correctly applied because his removal was not illegal but
merely unwarranted. The Illinois Supreme Court distinguished
Coffin on the basis that Coffin considered the question of
whether the plaintiff was entitled to the office and incidentally
to the salary. However, Coffin can more properly be distinguished on the basis of having dealt with an illegally removed
certified employee.
Coffin was expressly overruled in People ex rel. Durante v.
Burdett.6 7 A certified employee was suspended pending the
hearing on his dismissal, and charges were filed the following
day with the Commission. After the hearing, which took place
approximately three and one-half years after the filing of
charges, he was ordered reinstated by the Commission but was
refused back pay. The reason given by the Commission for such
refusal was that the long delay in the hearing was caused by
the employee's having made numerous technical objections and
by his unwarranted action in securing a writ of prohibition directed to the Commission which was overruled upon appeal. The
Illinois Supreme Court expressly followed the rule expounded
in Schmidt in affirming the Commission's denial of back salary
to the employee. There was no need for Coffin to be expressly
overruled since, as in Schmidt, the certified employee's dismissal
was merely unwarranted, not illegal.
Whether payment made to a de facto officer or employee
must be made by the employer in good faith was considered by
the Illinois Supreme Court in O'Connor v. City of Chicago.68
[P]roof of good faith in the payment of the salary or compensation of a public office or employment to the de facto incumbent
during the time that he performed its duties, prior to the reinstatement of the de jure officer or employee, is not a requisite
element of the defense of such payment to an action by the latter against the municipality for the same salary or compensation.69

Corbett v. City of Chicago70 analogized an illegal removal of
tion. He was reinstated after the decision of People ex rel. Baird v.
Stevenson. See notes 24, 25 and 26, supra and accompanying text.
66. 281 Ill. at 213, 117 N.E. at 1038. The court set out the rule to
resolve the "hopeless conflict" existing in Illinois and in other jurisdictions.
67. 283 Ill. 124, 118 N.E. 1009 (1918).
68. 327 Ill. 586, 158 N.E. 804 (1927).
69. Id. at 589, 158 N.E. at 805.
70. 391 Ill. 96, 62 N.E. 693 (1945).
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a certified employee to an employee wrongfully refused certification in refusing to allow the defense of payment to a de facto
employee. Plaintiffs had been wrongfully refused certification
as telephone operators. The Illinois Supreme Court held that
they were entitled to be paid from the date the circuit court
ordered their certification. In holding that the plaintiffs were
entitled to back salary from the date of their ordered certification
by the circuit court the supreme court stated that in cases where
the defense of payment to a de facto officer has been held good
"there has been the element of uncertainty as to the legal correctness of the claimant's position. . . [But it has never] been justified in the face of a judicial determination of the righteousness
of the claimant's position."' 71 The court recognized that had
plaintiffs been illegally removed certified employees, they would
have been entitled to back pay regardless of any payment to de
facto employees and that there was no good reason to distinguish
an illegally removed certified employee from one who was
7 2
wrongfully refused certification.
Where the illegally removed certified employee has worked
during the period in which he was illegally prevented from performing his duties, his salary must be reduced by outside earnings. In Kelly v. Chicago Park District73 the Illinois Supreme
Court recognized that when an officer is illegally prevented from
performing his duties any compensation earned is not to be deducted from the salary owing; however, an employee who is illegally removed from his duties may only recover his salary less
any compensation earned during the period of his illegal re74
moval.
71. Id. at 100, 62 N.E. at 695.
72. The plaintiffs had taken a civil service examination and had demanded certification in a lower classification for which an examination
had never been given. Plaintiffs had sought salary from the time the
circuit court ordered their certification in the lower classification. Had
the plaintiffs sought salary from the date of the Commission's refusal
to certify them it would have been denied up to the date of the court
order since there was an "element of uncertainty as to the correctness
of the claimant's position." Id.
73. 409 ill. 91, 98 N.E.2d 738 (1951).
74. Plaintiffs were employees of a non-civil service park district who
were discharged after consolidation with the Chicago Park District. They
had been discharged without notice and hearing. The court determined
that they had become certified employees upon consolidation and therefore had been entitled to notice and hearing prior to any discharge.
In exercising his amendatory veto upon a proposed amendment to
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 127, § 63b111 (1973) which would have permitted full
compensation without deductions for outside earnings, Governor Ogilvie
stated:
The purpose of an award for back pay is to protect the employee,
not punish the State. The employee is protected if he is compen-

sated at the same rate he would earn, if not suspended, no matter
what the source of compensation is.
H.R. JoUR. ILL., 77th Gen. Assembly, 1971 Sess., vol. III 5573.
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The cases are in an as yet unresolved conflict as to whether
a certified employee who is discharged is entitled to be paid for
the period during which he was suspended pending discharge.
The first case to address this question was Brewton v. Civil Service Commission75 in which the Illinois Appellate Court for the
First District, Third Division, held that 'a suspended certified employee was entitled to salary until the time of his discharge less
the salary for the first 30 days of suspension. Since the appointing authority may suspend a certified employee for a period not
exceeding 30 days, the court reasoned that the employee who
has been suspended longer than 30 days is entitled to reinstatement with pay after 30 days even though charges of dismissal
are pending. It is no different than a situation in which a certified employee has not been suspended prior to discharge upon
hearing.
However, the Illinois Appellate Court for the First District,
Fourth Division, reached a contrary result in People ex rel. Cotter v. Conlisk 76 and expressly refused to follow Brewton.
'[I]t would be incongruous to conclude that the Legislature
would provide a form of discipline which would propel this Court
into conferring that which many individuals might deem a happy
boon and a favor, i.e., pay without work. The status of being
without pay is an incident of suspension.' Similarly, it would
be incongruous . . . for a police officer under charges for taking
advantage of his office to be paid while waiting to be officially
discharged.
[O]ne who has been suspended pending dismissal has no
right to a salary unless his discharge
is found to be unwarranted
77
[by the administrative authority].
CAUSE--As IT RELATES TO DISCHARGE
Generally
Kammann v. City of Chicago78 raises the interesting and often
belabored question of "cause." In this case the Supreme Court
of Illinois held that since the statute is silent as to what constitutes "cause", the right to determine that question is left with
the Civil Service Commission.
The "just cause" grounds for dismissal of civil service employees are generally based on:
incompetence, inefficiency, insubordination, infidelity, neglect of
duty, absence from duty, conduct unbecoming an officer or employee, malfeasance, misfeasance, exercise of unusually bad judgment, commission of a crime, discrediting the service, disloyalty,
75. 115 Ill. App. 2d 460, 253 N.E.2d 504 (1969).

76. 17 Ill. App. 3d 346, 308 N.E.2d 1 (1974).
77. Id. at 347-48, 308 N.E.2d at 2.
78. 222 Ill. 63, 78 N.E. 16 (1906).
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refusal to testify when lawfully required, derogatory remarks
against a superior or other employee, absence without leave, soliciting bribes, drunkenness, false statement made in course of employment, failure to report when ordered, uncooperativeness, unprofessional conduct, accepting gratuities, fraud in examination
or appointment, and virtually any other dereliction which among
reasonable-minded men might not be viewed as specious or trivial.79
An examination of the above grounds reveals that they are all
job related, and under Illinois law the offense must be "related
' ' 80
to the requirements of ... service.
In Nolting v. Civil Service Commission 8 in the course of
its analysis, the court stated that since the statute8 2 does not
define "cause", the legislature left the definition of cause and
its application to the discretion of the Commission, unless the
findings of the Commission "are so unrelated to requirements
'88
of the service or so trivial as to be unreasonable and arbitrary.
Cause Involving Political Considerations
As previously stated, the intent of all civil service acts is
to eliminate the evils of the "spoils" system. With this in mind,
it is difficult to envision how removal based solely upon the political affiliation of an employee could be justified as job related,
and thus not unreasonable or arbitrary.
In the recent Seventh Circuit case of Illinois State Employees
Union, Council 34 v. Lewis,8 4 the court was faced with the issue
of whether a non-policy making employee, such as a janitor or
a driver's license examiner, could be discharged for refusing to
transfer his political allegiance. The Court of Appeals, in reversing the District Court's holding for the defendant, stated:
Unlike a civil service system, the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution does not provide job security, as such, to public employees. If, however, a discharge is motivated by considerations
of race, religion, or punishment of constitutionally protected
conduct, it is well settled that the State's action is subject to
federal judicial review.
79. H.E. KAPLAN, supra note 1, at 257 & n.34.
80. Nolting v. Civil Service Comm'n, 7 1ll. App. 2d 147, 163, 129
N.E.2d 236, 244 (1955).
81. 7 Ill. App. 2d 147, 129 N.E.2d 236 (1955).
82. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 127, § 63b111 (1973). For text of statute see
note 14 supra.
83. 7 Ill. App. 2d at 155, 129 N.E.2d at 240. In Arnett v. Kennedy,
42 U.S.L.W. 4513 (U.S. April 16, 1974), the United States Supreme Court
held that the standard of "cause" as set forth in the Lloyd-LaFollette
Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 7501 et seq. (1970), as a limitation on the Government's
authority to discharge federal employees is "constitutionally sufficient
against the charges both of overbreadth and of vagueness." 42 U.S.L.W.
at 4520.
84. 473 F.2d 561 (7th Cir. 1972).
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[A] nontenured public servant has no constitutional right to
public employment, but nevertheless may not be dismissed for
exercising his First Amendment rights.
[C]onsiderations of personal loyalty, or other factors besides determination of policy, may justify the employment of political
associates in certain positions. It is difficult to believe, however,
that any such justification would be valid for positions such as
janitors, elevator operators or school teachers.
It is now axiomatic 'that the state and federal governments, even
in the exercise of their internal operations, do not constitutionally have the complete freedom of action enjoyed by a private
employer'.

. .

. The price which a government must pay to pro-

tect the constitutional liberties of its employees is some loss of
the efficiency enjoyed by private employers; the Supreme Court
the value of those individual liberhas repeatedly decided that
85
ties is well worth the cost.

Judge Campbell, in his concurring opinion, stated:
'For if the government could deny a benefit to a person because
of his constitutionally protected speech or associations, his exercise of those freedoms would in effect be penalized and inhibited.
This would allow the government to 'produce a result which (it)
could not command directly.' Such interference with constitutional rights is impermissible.' 86
Judge Campbell also noted that the decision in this Circuit
stands in sharp and irreconcilable conflict with the decision in the
Second Circuit in the case of Alomar v. Dwyer,87 and with a
Pennsylvania state court decision.8 8 In both of these cases the
courts rejected, as a matter of law, the plaintiffs' claim that discharge from government jobs because of allegiance to one political party and refusal to join or support another violated first
amendment rights of freedom of association."
CONCLUSION

Historically, the Civil Service Merit System was developed
to avoid the excesses and injustices inherent in the "spoils" system. Although government, as much as any private employer,
has a great interest in the efficient conduct of its business unim85. Id. at 567-75.
86. Id. at 577 (citations omitted).

87. 447 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1971).
88. American Foundation of State, County & Municipal Employees
v. Shapp, 443 Pa. 527, 280 A.2d 375 (1971).
89. He also noted that two district judges in the seventh circuit have

followed the Alomar and Shapp decisions and rejected the claims that

public employees cannot be discharged because of their political party
affiliations with violating the first amendment. See Burns v. Elrod, No.
71C607 (N.D. Ill. May 31, 1972), appeal pending, Nos. 71-1285, 72-1541,
argued, October 23, 1973; Shakman v. Democratic Organization of Cook
County, 310 F. Supp. 1398 (N.D. Ill. 1969), rev'd, 435 F.2d 267 (7th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 909 (1971).
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peded by inefficient and disruptive employees, the civil service
system affords an umbrella of protection against arbitrary and
capricious suspension or discharge by its provisions for due process safeguards.
In Illinois the merit system is dedicated to a fair and impartial selection of public employees based initially upon performance on a competitive examination. Once a government employee has been certified after his six month probationary period,
he is brought under the protective umbrella of the Civil Service
laws. These laws have evolved to protect both the rights of a
civil service employee once certified and the rights of the government employer.
Whenever the rights of the certified employee conflict with
the duties owed his government employer, the conflict is adjudicated by the appropriate administrative commission, subject to
review by the courts. Under a review, whether on appeal under
the Administrative Review Act or by writ of certiorari or mandamus, the procedural due process rights of the employee are
strictly adhered to and protected, and, where necessary, the constitutional rights of the employee are zealously guarded.
With the ever increasing challenge to governmental action
based upon the denial of first amendment rights, the courts, both
state and federal, are faced with the problem of balancing the
need of affording adequate protection for these rights existing
in the employee against the employer's interest in maintaining
stability and control over his work force.
When this challenge is made in the federal courts, will the
inevitable effect be to convert these courts into super civil service
commissions which, as was pointed out in Nolting,90 will have a
detrimental effect on the functioning of government? Will the
Illinois administrative agencies be compelled to discourage discharge of employees, where legal justification exists, in order to
avoid adjudication of unfounded charges by such employees that
their discharges constituted a violation of their first amendment
rights, such as political affiliations, thus leading to innumerable
trials and appeals? Should government be burdened with the
tremendous expenses, both monetary and temporal, resulting
from such litigation?
On the other hand, how can state courts, with these same
considerations in mind, refuse to follow the dictates of federal
law when fundamental constitutional rights are violated-rights
which should be guarded and protected, such as those involving
race and religion or other constitutionally protected conduct.
90. 7 IM.App. 2d 147, 153, 129 N.E.2d 236, 239 (1955).
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When confronted with these problems the state and federal
courts are attempting to balance the interests of the employee,
the employer and the public.
Although the future may bring some changes in the Civil
Service laws, the merit system should remain and should be
guarded from erosion because of its proven fundamental fairness
and the reasonable protection it affords to the rights of the employee, the rights of his governmental employer as well as the
interests of their sovereign employer-the public.
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